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INTRODUCTION
The expansion of the global economy into an interconnected world has given rise to many consequential changes, among which we have to pinpoint periods of financial instability that no longer remain a topic of concern to single countries or governments, but instead turn out to be a matter of international distress.
Deeply rooted with these disrupting happenings, extensively researched by Minsky in his landmark book Stabilizing an Unstable Economy (1986) , this paper puts forward a deviant behavior that we encounter in some organizations that easily resort to opaque governance in their pursuit of hiding transactions, hence isolating themselves from regulations, transparency and accountability.
Section 1 introduces the notion of opaque governance. Section 2 deals with special purposes vehicles, while next section handles the issue of how slippery and deceitful their governance turn out to be. Section 4 expands on a distinctive vehicle called "collateralized-debt obligation fund". Section 5 outlines the global arrangements through which special purpose vehicles mushroom boundlessly: the offshore locations. Last section winds up the paper by focusing on the sensitive issue of regulation, gatekeepers and connivance with disreputable practices.
OPAQUE GOVERNANCE
Let us assume that we are concerned with certain company c k belonging to a wellknown sample space: After these preliminaries, we move on to the key concept of this section 1 .
Definition 1 Opaque Governance
By Opaque Governance we mean a substitution process whose main features and outcomes are the following: 
Remark:
Definitions, within the scope of this paper, stand for a semantic and methodological vehicle on behalf of any considered reader who may ask himself: which is the meaning the author attaches to such and such expression? Under no circumstance our definitions intend to be regarded the best available, still less the only ones that might be adopted.
Examples of opaque governance frameworks abound; for instance, those that nurture rent-seeking, soft-budget constraints, and tunneling. I have researched these patterns of deviant behavior elsewhere 2 . Instead, my aim in this paper lies on a relatively newcomer in the pursuit of opaque governance: the so-called special purpose vehicle, SPV, which has conspicuously been used and played such a disgraceful role in the financial instability that accrued as from 2007.
A final comment is in order to bring home the gist of the matter: the less enforceable the law becomes and the more lenient governments turn out to be, then the more opaque the governance of organizations will grow eventually 3 .
SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES
These organizational forms are legal entities that require a sponsoring entity.
Among the sponsors or sellers, we find commercial banks, finance companies, investment banks, insurance companies, non-financial corporations, or charitable foundations 4 , whereas on the side of SPVs there will be limited liability companies, partnerships, corporations, and trusts. One distinguishing feature of these organizations consists in their being isolated from any likely financial distress of the sponsors; on this ground, it said that they grant "bankruptcy remoteness" to investors.
The plain-vanilla mechanism by which the SPVs operate, comprises the following characteristics (see Exhibit 1):
a) The sponsor sells assets to the SPV, receiving money for them.
b) The SPV sells securities to investors and shifts the money to the sponsor.
c) The sponsor contracts out a corporate-server provider to manage the SPV's administrative functions, even recruiting staff and directors.
d) Sometimes, a Trustee may also be appointed to care for the creditors' property rights.
We can list the most conspicuous examples of SPVs 5 :
▪ residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities;
▪ collateralized debt obligations;
▪ asset-backed commercial paper programs;
5 Further details can be found in the Report on Special Purpose Entities (Basel Bank, 2009 The essence of structured finance activities is the pooling of economic assets like loans, bonds, and mortgages, and the subsequent issuance of a prioritized capital structure of claims, known as tranches, against these collateral pools.
[…] This ability of structured finance to repackage risks and to create "safe" assets from otherwise risky collateral led to a dramatic expansion in the issuance of structured securities, most of which were viewed by investors to be virtually risk-free and certified as such by the rating agencies. At the core of the recent financial market crisis has been the discovery that these securities are actually far riskier than originally
There has been a broad wave of criticism around the misuse of these organizations throughout the last global financial crisis. For instance, it's worth giving heed to the following allegation by the Basel Bank in its "Report on Special Purposes Entities" 7 , published in September 2009:
It must be emphasized that the usage of SPE structures is not inherently problematic in and on itself.
[ … ]The current market crisis that began in mid-2007, however, essentially "stress tested" these vehicles. As a result, serious deficiencies in the understanding and risk management of these SPEs were identified. (p. 1) 6 An opinionated assessment of financial innovation can be found in a special survey published by The Economist (2012b).
7 "Special purpose entity" is the customary expression used by the Basel Bank when referring to SPVs. 
THE OPAQUE GOVERNANCE OF SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES
This balanced cash-flow system is denoted the "incremental cash-flow model" 9 , whereby we can add precision to the intuition lent by Exhibit 1. The SPV purchases a portfolio of securitizable loans and pays off with cash.
Therefore, the SPV morphs one asset type into another. The logic of securitizaton consists in that the organization can issue its own securities against and with guarantee of those assets.
In carrying out their line of business, the financial institution gets funds not from their depositors, like in the usual partial-reserve system monitored by any central bank, but out in the shadowy non-banking financial system 10 , as the shift from (1) towards (2) bear witness. Therefore, incremental cash flows for the SPV and the bank will end up this way: Afterwards, we are going to underlie the SPV's governance main characteristics.
Ownership structure
Certain features about the ownership structure depend on the country where the vehicle is created. In the UK, a widely favored organization type is the limited purpose corporation, either domestic or offshore, which entails the use of a charitable trust as owner of the entity. In the USA, predominant ownership structures are the limitedliability corporations following Delaware regulations, while a trust entity is the vehicle.
Purposes of the SPV
In either case, when organizations are incorporated or legally enacted, their purposes are bound to the ownership structure and attested so in their founding charters.
On this account, SPVs are single purpose entities. Basically, they hold assets, upon which they issue securities, as it highlighted in relation (3).
Control and Management
The ownership structure and control rights depend on the legal jurisdiction chosen to incorporate the SPV. In the UK, for example, it is frequently favored the enactment of the so-called "orphan vehicles", whose capital is nominal and held on behalf a charitable trust (Northern Bank is a case in point). The advantage is that the originator does neither own nor control the SPV. Things are different for SPVs in the USA, because the sponsor owns the vehicle when it is a limited liability company, but the latter is legally different from the parental company. When the SPV performs like a securitized entity, its assets are pledged to a trust.
As for management and staff, SPVs have no employees, and the sponsors subcontract all ancillary activities to corporate-service providers, who deal with the logistics, management, and even board building with independent directors, pertaining to the SPV's needs. As Gorton and Metrick (2010a) sardonically put it, "SPVs are like robots".
Assets sales
How do owners and the board of the SPV deal with control rights? The sponsor sells assets, usually writing them off from its balance sheet, a fact that is put forward in relation (4). With the money on tap from investors, the SPV brings the purchase of assets into completion, which gives the SPV a comprehensive control right.
Bankruptcy remoteness
This feature is naturally embedded in the Statute of Governance or by-laws. The assets are isolated from the sponsor's creditors reach.
Accountability and transparency
SPVs have become the darlings of the shadow banking system 11 just because they foster lack of diligence processes and transparency practices, showing an utter disregard for any sort of accountability design at the end of the day. In point of fact, (3) paves the way to this lenient behavior.
COLLATERALIZED DEBT OBLIGATIONS
Collateralized debt obligations, CDOs, carried out an important role in the last financial crisis. The simple vanilla SPV depicted 12 on Exhibit 1 can be regarded as a stylized and particular environment for CDOs. In contradistinction with vehicles shaped to fill in the needs of residential and commercial mortgage-backed SPVs, the asset-side of any CDO consists of a variegated portfolio of different financial assets:
11 Gorton and Metrick (2010b) seems a good starting point to do research on this topic.
12 Section 2.
▪ investment grade corporate bonds;
▪ emerging markets bonds;
▪ securitized bank loans;
▪ trust preferred securities (in short, trups)
▪ other CDOs ▪ commercial paper.
Therefore, a CDO performs as a portfolio manager, a trust fund, that issues their own securities backed by the financial assets that belong to the underlying portfolio. In spite of some financial advantages, these vehicles are two-edged constructs, whose bad edge follows from the fact that they contribute to credit expansion beyond any prudential measure and control of regulators. Let us examine this point in further detail by means of Exhibit 2.
For the sake of illustration, let us consider a financial institution that sponsors three SPVs designed after the CDO's structure. The bank, taking advantage of a portfolio of credits (mortgage-backed or secured otherwise) sells it to his SPV-1, which issues CDOs backed by the securitized portfolio 13 . In point of fact, the money that SPV-1 gets from the CDOs sale is used to repay the bank for the securitized portfolio. After the transaction is brought into completion, the bank substitutes new money for old credits.
At this juncture, the bank has two basic options: either lends money to companies and households, under the guise of plain-vanilla loans; or it buys mortgages, credit cards receivables, cars and trucks loans or leases, and the sort, which are easily securitized. In other words, the bank funds its credit lines without taking deposits, what amounts to credit expansion outside the central bank mechanism of proportional reserves.
Next step replicates the pattern of the first stage, whereby SPV-2 buys a portfolio of credits in the bank's books, and issues CDOs, but with an innovation: SPV-2 can buy not only the bank securitized portfolio, but other financial assets, among which CDOs 13 Mostly notes and bonds.
from other SPVs (even from the SPV-1 itself). After the full round-robin transaction is concluded, the bank will be able to set into motion SPV-3. As we guess, this is a process that can go on through several replications. stage. This device allows borrowing by selling spot financial assets, to repurchase them forward, and is a healthy procedure as long as the assets pledged to secure the loan do not worsen their value in the market beyond prudential thresholds. If this took place, SPVs would be unable to pay their securities since loan rates by Repos would wildly run upwards, whereas the value of collaterals go bust. The latest crisis, for some authors like Gorton and Metrick (2010a) , was a "run on Repo".
14 It is a procedure by which companies, investment funds, banks, and governments, engage themselves whenever they resort to new financing not only because they run short of cash to pay interest on their older borrowings, but mainly because they need to pay principals at maturity, borrowing again and again at increasing pace, in a situation that can be featured as a Catch-22 background. For a non-standard approach to financial conduits that sow the seeds of financial instability, Minsky's contribution is a major achievement. See references at the end of this paper.
OFFSHORE LOCATIONS
The global economy comprises not only onshore locations, but offshore ones as well. Coming up against so many corporate scandals, financial crises, outrageous misplacing of information, and the channeling of money out of criminal activities towards offshore conduits, academics and practitioners start to realize the great import of these places for the understanding of what is happening down-to-earth, here and now.
Definition 3 Offshore Centers
By offshore centers we mean sovereign places 15 (Palan,, 2006 (Palan,, , 2010 Shakson, 2011; The Economist, 2012a). companies, use of tax havens for individuals, hedge funds for non-residents, preferential tax regimes, export processing zones, flags of convenience, e-commerce 16 .
Although some quarters could remind us about the legal foundations of offshore locations, they likely fail to point out that those places eventually become purchasers and sellers of sovereignty, providing and granting secrecy for the setting up of shell companies and hedge funds in the shadows, catering without distinction not only corporate actors and single investors that seek more flexible frameworks for their transactions, but also big players in drug-dealing, terrorism, political corruption, tax evasion, gambling, and weaponry brokerage.
Sidestepping central banks, security exchange commissions, internal revenue services, gatekeepers and shareholders, they promise hidden harbors and impunity, and they deliver both, with the connivance of law and auditing firms, even investment banks. By essence, offshore centers embrace thousands of companies, financial portfolios, and investment accounts, with contempt for transparency, accountability and due diligence.
To put it in other words, they are builders of opaque governance.
Besides this irrefutable indictment, I still contend that offshore locations could become a better place than they are. For instance, supplying export facilities zones to improve the connectivity of countries and markets into the global economy.
To all intents and purposes, the most important measures that offshore centers ought to take involve two courses of action: 
REGULATIONS, GATEKEEPERS, AND CONNIVANCE
One thing is to realize that the financial system nurtures internal mechanisms that lead to financial instability. But quite another thing seems to admit that internal players, loopholes in the regulation, as well as pervading connivance among governments, gatekeepers, and even stakeholders, foster such instability, and bring damage to households, enterprises, and taxpayers over whole economies.
Although a good question is whether the regulatory framework ought to have prevented abuses of the shadow financial system from taking place, the actual issues to be discussed here, at least for the main subject of this paper, are the following:
▪ What is the extent to which regulations can become enforceable?
▪ How could regulations be shaped up?
▪ Why do gatekeepers so persistently fail in complying their fiduciary duties?
Let us move on to give an answer to each question, as straightforwardly as possible.
WHAT IS THE EXTENT TO WHICH REGULATIONS CAN BECOME ENFORCEABLE?
In most countries, the main regulators in charge of interpreting and making regulations enforceable for their formal financial system are two: central banks and securities exchange commissions 17 . In the first case, regulation consists in a legal framework that determines when and how a financial institution is allowed to exist, and a battery of "resolutions or decrees" by which the central banks set operational constraints to lending, borrowing, and foreign exchange transactions, as well capital requirements and risk supervision for banks. In the second case, securities and exchange commissions deal with listed companies that place their debt or equity into the public offer mechanism, as well as with qualified intermediaries, from brokers to dealers, engaged with publicly primary and secondary transactions.
17 There are countries whose capital markets are not so developed to allow for an independent security exchange commission. In those cases, the central bank has a superintendency to deal with public offers, as it is found in Uruguay, Ecuador, Colombia, at the time this book was published.
A striking feature that stems from reviewing the role of regulators is that they busy -Institutional investors that engineer conduits for private placements.
-Investment funds that offer both offshore locations and also a variegated spate of SPVs to investors and borrowers alike, in particular Hedge Funds.
▪ Any company that borrows or lends money through offshore locations or SPVs, by means of private placements that skip over the overlooking of central banks, securities exchange commissions or internal revenue services in their onshore locations. 18 We have to bear in mind that a loan from an institutional investor or a bank can be assimilated to debt privately placed. In fact, it behaves like a bond when we regard the loan from the viewpoint of its underlying cash flows. 19 An expression used in the Basel Bank Report on Special Purpose Vehicles. 20 On the Euromarket's nature and consequences, see Palan's books about offshore locations (2003, 2010 ).
Is it any wonder then, after reading this list of makers and users, that the majority of financial transactions are neither regulated nor controlled, or still worse, that financial systems frequently evolve towards instability? Still worse, is it surprising that the abovementioned conduits make huge profits from opaque governance concoctions?
HOW COULD REGULATIONS BE SHAPED UP?
There are − Ring-fencing retail banking from other activities 21 should become mandatory.
c) The risks of regulation and the missionary's zeal
Regulators redress wrongs, but they also commits wrongs on their own, mainly when they undertake their job with what I call the missionary's zeal whereby they assume that the more regulation they enact, the better the world becomes. A clinical approach to such organizations conveys a self-evident diagnostic and treatment:
firstly, upgrade their governance and, secondly, make themselves more accountable, transparent and diligent.
d) The lack of incentives
Although the disgraceful failure of gatekeepers and sometimes their apparent connivance at corporate regrettable practices, we can't help avoid the sensible issue of the sheer lack of incentives offered to officers working for regulators, which brings about a perverse mechanism forcefully described by Thomas Sowell (1996) :
Much criticism of "incompetent bureaucrats" implicitly assumes that those in the bureaucracy are pursuing the assigned goal but failing to achieve it due to lack of ability. In fact, they may be responding very rationally and ably to the set of incentives facing them. For example, government regulatory agencies are often very ineffective in controlling the industry or sector which they have a legal mandate to regulate. But it is a common pattern in such agencies for those in decision-making positions to (1) earn far less money than comparable individuals earn in the regulated sector, and (2) after a few years' experience to move in to jobs in the regulated sector. In short, they are regulating their future employers. Under such a set of incentives, it is hardly surprising that decision makers in regulatory agencies approach those whom they are assigned to regulate with an attitude that is sympathetic, cooperative, and even protective. (p. 15)
WHY DO GATEKEEPERS SO PERSISTENTLY FAIL COMPLYING THEIR FIDUCIARY DUTIES?
In the mainstream debate about the instability of financial systems, several sources of such instability have utterly been disregarded so far, as if they were not relevant at all. However, such sources are relevant, among which we can notice special purpose vehicles, offshore locations, shadow financial systems beyond any control, regulators trapped by a narrowing scope for their supervisory role and, on the side of gatekeepers a suspicious lack of will for changing their opaque governances 22 .
Whereas many actors carry the task of being a gatekeeper, the following ones are the most influential in the financial system, both in the regulated as in the non-regulated fields of experience:
auditing and law firms; investment banks; big market dealers; credit rating agencies; market analysts working independently; economic and financial journalism;
non-governmental organizations acting as watchdogs of the system; research institutes, working independently or as research units within universities;
international organizations like the OECD, World Bank, IMF, the Basel Bank.
There is wide and longstanding empirical evidence about the failure of gatekeepers. For the sake of illustration, we can refer the reader to Professor Coffee 
THE PREACHER'S WAIVER
In this section, we raise some queries and bring forward a plausible course of action to shape up the rules of the game in the financial system. a) Many of those gatekeepers do a profitable trade indeed, by apparently watching over banks and companies, rating their performance, advising on governance issues, being opinionated on financial tools of which they barely know their nature or their risk profiles in depth.
However, the most outrageous feature that gatekeepers have been displaying in the last four decades consists in the Preacher's Sympton, a pattern of behavior that could be briefed this way and public realm to grow more accountable and transparent on behalf of their fiduciary duties, why will they not set an example?
The treatment is crystal clear: improve the governance of gatekeepers by setting up stronger regulatory frameworks, requesting in all cases an enforceable Statute of Governance.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has set forth the meaning of opaque governance and morphed this notion into special purpose vehicles. Afterwards, we have expanded about collateralized debt obligations and offshore locations.
Next, the paper addressed the subject of regulations, gatekeepers and the regrettable connivance of most actors in the financial system. In closing, it was offered a clinical approach to manage opaque governances, with a down-to-earth and pragmatic frame of mind to fix the problem.
